Proposal Mechanics
The proposal asks Polygon PoS validators to approve a coordinated network update. This update will zero out balances at five attacker-controlled addresses. It will credit the same amounts to verified recovery addresses designated by the affected platforms. Currently, the funds are locked and cannot be transferred. Polygon states the current blocking list lacks a mechanism to return money to legitimate owners.
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The incidents occurred on October 29 and 30. Approximately 23.86 million POL are linked to the Polymarket case. Another 46.63 million POL are associated with the Binance incident. At the platforms' request, all elected block producers added the identified addresses to their Bor transaction lists. Polygon describes this arrangement as a temporary measure, not a permanent solution.
Technical Challenges
Blocking lists are only read at block producer startup. This means every update requires a Bor implementation and restart, or a span rotation. The filtering mechanism also leaves room for bypass attempts, as it does not cover all possible transaction paths.
Recovery Process
Polygon highlighted an attempted transaction involving a fee of approximately 219,450 POL. Validators were also offered money in exchange for help unlocking a transaction. Under the proposal, balances at four Polymarket-linked addresses and one Binance-linked address would be moved at a fixed block height. Both platforms must prove control over their respective recovery addresses and confirm in writing that they are authorized to receive the funds.
Scope and Governance
The proposal covers only native POL at the five listed addresses. Other tokens remain out of scope. USDT stolen from Binance was already frozen by Tether, so the proposed fork will not affect those funds. Polygon emphasizes that this is an extreme measure. It should not become standard practice or establish a general mechanism for freezing and recovering user funds. Before the change reaches the mainnet, it must pass through Polygon's governance process. It must be developed and tested on the Amoy testnet and receive necessary validator support.
